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THE BORDERS THAT LAW SETS ON ENTERTAINMENT 
 
Professor Des Butler 
Faculty of Law 
Queensland University of Technology 
 
It is natural for those involved in entertainment to focus on the art.  However, like any activity in 
even a free society, those involved in entertainment industries must operate within borders set by 
the law.  This article examines the main areas of law that impact entertainment in an Australian 
context.  It contrasts the position in relation to freedom of expression in Australia with that in the 
United States, which also promotes freedom of expression in a free society.  It then briefly canvases 
the main limits on entertainment productions under Australian law. 
 
1. Why care about the law? 
 
It is natural for those involved in entertainment to focus on the art.  Freedom in artistic endeavour is 
an important part of living in a free society.  However, even in a free society the law sets parameters 
or boundaries for the kind of conduct that is regarded as acceptable as part of living in a community.  
Entertainment, like all walks of life, must function within these borders. 
 
Collectively the laws relevant to entertainment may be described by the label "entertainment law".  
However, there is no specialist set of laws which apply specifically to entertainment industries.  
Instead, the laws that are relevant to entertainment are drawn from a collection of different areas 
that can have an impact on all phases of the entertainment process.  These include the creation 
phase, such as writing, composing or designing; the transaction phase such as communicating, 
publishing or exhibiting; and the consumption phase such as viewing, reading or listening. 
 
It would go too far to suggest that everyone involved in entertainment, whether at an artistic or 
more managerial level, should have an intricate knowledge and understanding of the laws that 
govern artistic endeavours.  However, a better general understanding of the kinds of laws that may 
be applicable in a given situation can help facilitate more efficient and effective communication with 
lawyers who have that intricate knowledge and understanding, as well as help to avoid potential 
legal problems in the first place.   
 
This article examines the main areas of law that impact entertainment in an Australian context.  It 
aims at providing an entry level overview that will help those involved in entertainment in Australia 
to understand the legal parameters within which they are required to function. 
 
2. Entertainment and free speech 
 
A common misunderstanding of those involved in artistic endeavour is that there is a fundamental 
right to free speech and free expression which entitles an artist an unfettered freedom to create or 
perform whatever he or she wishes.  However, freedom of speech is a nebulous concept which 
carries different connotations, even in different "free" countries such as Australia and the United 
States. 
 
Both Australia and the United States are "common law" countries.  Under a common law system the 
law is found in the judgments of courts, in contrast to the collections of written codes which are the 
hallmark of "civil law" systems such as may be found in continental European countries.  In addition, 
elected parliaments may pass statutes to address specific issues which may complement or override 
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judge made law.  Accordingly, the laws that govern activities such as those pursued by 
entertainment industries may be a combination of court decisions and statute laws. 
 
Despite the similarity in legal systems in Australia and the United States, differences remain in 
relation to matters including the approach to free speech.  In the United States the first Amendment 
to the Constitution enshrines a right to free speech for its citizens:  “Congress shall make no law … 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press …”   This benchmark expression of the right to free 
speech has been subjected to extensive interpretation in United States courts, particularly the 
Supreme Court of the United States, which have considered its application across a broad range of 
circumstances.  However, despite the apparent breadth of this constitutional guarantee, even in the 
United States freedom of speech is not completely unfettered.  As the famous jurist Oliver Wendell 
Holmes once stated: “The most stringent protection of freedom of speech would not protect a man 
in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic” (Schenck v United States 249 US 47, 52 
(1919)).  The level of protection accorded to different types of speech can occasionally fluctuate 
according to factors such as changes in society and even the composition of the Supreme Court 
bench considering the case.  The appropriate limits to be placed on subversive speech (see, for 
example, Dennis v United States 341 US 494 (1951)), threats of violence (Chaplinsky v New 
Hampshire 315 US 568 (1942)), racist speech (Brandenburg v Ohio 395 US 444 (1969)), defamation 
(New York Times v Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964)) and pornography (American Booksellers Association v 
Hudnut 771 F 2d 323 (7th Cir, 1985)) in the face of the constitutional guarantee have been among 
the more contentious issues. 
 
While the pronouncements in such cases, including the exposition of theoretical underpinnings of 
free speech, may have some relevance for the determination of the appropriate limits to be applied 
in Australia, there are fundamental differences between the legal systems in the two countries.  
Principally, the Australian Constitution does not contain an equivalent to the first Amendment 
guarantee of free speech.  Unlike the United States Constitution, which was born from the 
declaration of independence from English sovereignty, the shift to an Australian Federation was not 
seen as a revolutionary move.  It was therefore thought that protection of liberty, including free 
speech, could safely remain the province of the common law and any legislation passed by State or 
Commonwealth parliaments which are representative of, and responsible to, the people 
(Charlesworth (1986); Chesterman (2000)).   Under the common law the overarching principle 
remains in effect that "where Freedom ends the Law begins and where the Law ends Freedom 
begins" (Kocourek 1928, 22).  In other words, in Australia freedom of speech is a residual right, 
existing where the various laws such as defamation, obscenity and so on do not apply.  In practice 
this may have important implications when determining the bounds of permissible endeavour in the 
entertainment context. 
 
3. Setting the parameters: some relevant limits 
 
While it would not be possible in advance to list the multitude of laws that could apply to myriad of 
circumstances that could arise in entertainment context, it is possible to identify some of the main 
areas that may be more commonly encountered.  Almost all entertainment productions will involve 
some form of contract law, whether in the creation, transaction or consumption phases of the 
production.  Many if not most will involve copyright issues.  Issues such as obscenity, censorship and 
defamation may also have relevance in certain cases.  A brief examination of some of the questions 
raised by these laws may be instructive. 
 
3.1 Contract law 
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Contract law concerns the determination of which promises may be legally enforceable, the extent 
of the obligations created by those promises and the consequences if those promises are unfulfilled.  
Film producer Louis B Mayer is reputed to have said words to the effect that "an oral contract isn't 
worth the paper it's written on". This is a common misconception.  While a verbal contract may be 
more difficult to prove than one that is in writing, a verbal contract may be no less legally binding.  A 
contract becomes legally enforceable at common law when there is a concluded agreement, 
supported by "consideration," where there is an intention to create legal relations (Willmott et al 
2009).  There is generally no requirement that the contract be in writing unless the subject matter of 
the agreement is of a certain nature, such as the sale or other disposition of land or the provision of 
credit, in which cases statute law has been enacted in all Australian states and territories requiring 
that the agreement be made or evidenced by sufficient writing. 
 
When agreements are made in a commercial context, there will be little doubt that the agreement 
was made with an intention to create legal relations.  "Consideration" reflects the notion that a 
contract involves a bargain in which something must be given in return for something being 
received: consideration is the price of the promise (Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company Ltd v Selfridge 
& Company Ltd: [1915 AC 847).  For example, where a band agrees to perform in a club, the 
consideration for that performance is the club's promise to pay for the performance.  Conversely the 
consideration for the club's promise to pay is the band's promise to perform.  Such a mutual 
exchange of promises will be a common feature in entertainment contracts.  Accordingly the 
essential question when determining whether an enforceable contract exists in the context of 
entertainment will usually be whether a concluded agreement has been reached.  This can 
sometimes involve questions such as whether an offer has been effectively accepted, counter offers 
and whether a consensus has been reached between the parties with a sufficient degree of 
certainty. 
 
Once a contract has been concluded both parties are obliged to perform their obligations exactly.  
The nature of those obligations will naturally depend upon the purpose the contract seeks to 
achieve but may also be affected by factors such as the relative bargaining power of the parties.  
Generally speaking, at common law a court has no absolving power or ability to rewrite a contract 
that is considered to be unfair or one-sided (Faramus v Film Artistes’ Association (1963) 1 All ER 
636).  There are exceptions to this general position.  One concerns contracts in restraint of trade.  A 
restraint of trade is typically a clause in a contract by which one of the parties agrees to restrict his 
or her freedom to carry on trade with other persons who are not parties to the contract.  Such 
clauses are common in the entertainment industries, and would include, for example, a musician 
promising to write and/or record exclusively for one recording company for the duration of the 
contract or an actor in a film promising not to appear in another production without prior 
permission from his or her film producer (see, for example, Warner Brothers Pictures Plc v Nelson 
[1936] 3 All ER 160 concerning the actor Bette Davis) .  Generally speaking all restraints of trade are 
presumed to be void.  However, that presumption can be rebutted if the restraint can be justified, in 
the sense that it can be shown to be reasonable both as between the parties and in the interests of 
the public (Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co Ltd [1894] AC 535).  Whether the 
restraint is reasonable between the parties will depend upon whether the restraint goes no further 
than is recently necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the party benefiting from the 
restraint, such as the recording company or film producer.  Thus, for example, in Schroeder Music 
Publishing Co v Macauley [1974] 3 All ER 616 a young songwriter entered into a contract with a 
music publishing company, under which the songwriter gave the company the copyright of all his 
compositions for five years, with an option for a further five years, in return for royalties.  There was 
no obligation on the part of the music publishing company to publish any of the songs and while the 
company could end the contract by giving one month’s written notice there was no corresponding 
right given to the songwriter.  This contract was held to be void because the restraint operated 
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further than was reasonably necessary to protect the company's legitimate interest in securing a 
source of songs.  Relevant factors in judging the reasonableness of a restraint will include the 
duration and geographical area of the restraint, the activities that it covers, the extent of any 
imbalance in the respective bargaining power of the parties and the monetary or other 
consideration being provided in return for the restraint. 
 
Another exception, which is limited to New South Wales, is the Contracts Review Act 1980.  This 
statute provides a wide power for courts exercising New South Wales jurisdiction to review 
contracts deemed to be “unjust”, which is defined to include "unconscionable, harsh or oppressive " 
terms.  Relevant factors include whether or not there was a material inequality of bargaining power, 
whether or not there was negotiation of the terms, whether there were conditions that are 
unreasonably difficult to comply with or were not reasonably necessary for the protection of the 
legitimate interests of a party, whether the contract was wholly or partly in writing and the language 
in which it is expressed, the conduct of the parties in relation to similar contracts or courses of 
dealing, and the commercial or other setting.  This statute could easily apply to contracts entered 
into in entertainment industries, particularly where one party to the contract is a large company 
often dealing on the basis of its own standard contract and the other party is an artist who is 
inexperienced in business matters.  However, there is as yet no similar legislation in the other 
Australian states and territories. 
 
3.2 Copyright 
 
Copyright is likely to be a pertinent issue in most, if not all, forms of entertainment whether in 
relation to the use of the artist's own work or the use of the work of others.  Under section 32 of the 
Copyright Act 1968 copyright subsists in an original literary, dramatic, musical or “artistic” work.  
"Artistic” work is defined in the statute as meaning: 
 
 (a) a painting, sculpture, drawing, engraving or photograph, whether the work is of 
artistic quality or not;  
 (b)   a building or a model of a building, whether the building or model is of artistic 
quality or not; or  
 (c)   any other work of artistic craftsmanship 
 
In the case of musical works, copyright subsists in the notation of the musical notes as opposed to 
lyrics, which are separately protected as literary works, and sound recordings of music, which are 
also the subject of a separate copyright. 
 
The statute prescribes no formalities for copyright to exist in a work.  Thus, for example, it is not 
necessary to register the work in order for copyright to subsist.  Nevertheless, it is clear from the 
scheme of the Act that the work must be original and reduced to material form, and that there must 
be a relevant connecting factor between the work and Australia.  This connection it is determined 
according to the place of publication of the work, the place of residency or citizenship of the artist 
and the place the work was made (Section 32).  
 
Under section 31 the owner of copyright is entitled to reproduce the work in a material form, publish 
the work and communicate the work to the public.  An exercise of any of these rights by a person 
who is not the owner of the copyright constitutes an infringement (Section 36).  For the purposes of 
the Act reproducing a "substantial part” of the work amounts to a breach of copyright in the whole 
work (section 14).  Copyright is regarded as property and is capable of being assigned or licensed by 
contract.   
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The practical difficulties that these provisions pose for those engaged in entertainment industries 
may be illustrated by the recent Federal Court decision in Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd v EMI  
Songs Australia Pty Limited [2010] FCA 29.  In that case it was held that the composers of the song 
Down Under by the band Men at Work infringed the copyright in the iconic children's song 
Kookaburra Sits in the Old Gum Tree.  The latter song consists of only four bars, two of which were 
reproduced as part of the flute riff added to Down Under after it was first composed.  It was held 
that despite a difference in harmony, key and structure, there was sufficient objective similarity for 
Down Under to amount to a substantial reproduction of the Kookaburra song and therefore amount 
to a breach of copyright. 
 
The concept of “substantial similarity” is at the heart of copyright law, yet it remains one of its most 
elusive aspects.  There is no fixed rule for determining how much of a copyright work must be taken 
before it is deemed to be a “substantial” part of the work.  This was shown by a case involving the 
weekly Network Ten program The Panel, which regularly rebroadcast excerpts of between eight and 
42 seconds in duration from programs originally broadcast by the rival Nine network, for the 
purposes of satirical and irreverent discussion.  A crucial question was whether the excerpts 
represented a substantial reproduction of the original work.  This was a question of quality, not 
primarily quantity.  It was held in the Full Court of the Federal Court that a pertinent question was 
whether what was taken amounted to "essentially the heart" or highlight – the most valuable and 
pertinent portion – of the copyrighted material (TCN Channel Nine Pty Limited  v Network Ten Pty 
Limited  (No 2) (2005) 216 ALR 631).  In the final analysis 15 of the 20 excerpts considered were 
deemed to be substantial reproductions, and of these nine were held to be protected by a defence 
under section 103A of the Copyright Act for fair dealing for the purpose of criticism or review.  
Accordingly Network Ten was found to have breached the Nine Network’s copyright in relation to six 
of the excerpts. 
 
3.3 Obscenity and censorship 
 
While there has been no question that the law should exercise control over publications, displays 
and other public activities that might be considered to be "obscene" or "indecent" the difficulty that 
arises in more modern times is whether the court should be acting as guardian of public decency or 
public morality, or both (Bray 1972).  At one time Australian authorities were zealous in suppressing 
literature which was considered to have a tendency to “deprave or corrupt”. Sometimes books were 
seized and impounded by customs officials simply on the strength of a provocative or suspicious 
looking title alone and without inquiry as to the contents.  Even Shakespeare’s Venus and Adonis was 
once banned on this ground. In 1958, 178 books were on the ban list in Australia, including classics 
such as DH Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover and Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita, in addition to works by 
authors such as James Joyce, Aldous Huxley and Ernest Hemmingway. In 1964 a “Commonwealth 
edition” of Harold Robbins’ The Carpetbaggers was published which included 125 deletions or 
changes to the original manuscript ranging from single words to passages of 50 to 100 words 
(Pollack 1990).   
 
Today the test for obscenity is that suggested by Justice Windeyer in the High Court of Australia: that 
which is offensive to “contemporary standards, community standards … those currently accepted by 
the Australian community” (Crowe v Graham (1968) 121 CLR 375, 399).   This test has the advantage 
of reflecting the fact that community standards change. All the circumstances, including the manner 
and occasion of the publication, must be considered.  Accordingly, something that is regarded as 
indecent in one context may be acceptable in another.  For example, there can be no absolute 
condemnation of activities or language without a consideration of the surrounding context – there is 
no such thing as inherent obscenity.  In this connection, it is relevant to take into account any 
literary or artistic purpose or design of the activities or language.  In Attorney-General v Twelfth 
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Night Theatre [1969] Qd R 319) the Queensland government sought an injunction preventing the use 
of the words “fuckin’ boong” in a stage play called “Norman and Ahmed”.  While the court 
acknowledged that the words would be considered obscene if uttered in the street, in the context of 
the play, which was a social commentary, they were held not to have this effect. 
 
However, the test based on contemporary standards as reflecting "those currently accepted by the 
Australian community" may be problematic in the absence of a common set of Australian standards 
(Fox 1969).  It could be suggested that there may be differences in the norms of social behaviour, 
including standards of decency, within a State or Territory, such as differing norms in capital cities 
like Brisbane or Perth and in more remote communities such as those in Cape York or in the 
Kimberley region respectively.  In the United States, the diversity of communities of America led the 
Supreme Court to hold that “community standards” should be local rather than national. The people 
of Maine or Mississippi were not expected to accept the conduct found tolerable in places like Las 
Vegas or New York City (Miller v California 413 US 15 (1973)).  However, as one judge pointed out, a 
danger that this approach creates is that “national distributors choosing to send their products 
interstate will be forced to cope with the community standards of every hamlet in which their goods 
may wander” (Brennan J in dissent in Hamling v US 418 US 87 (1974)). This threat is not just an 
academic one. For example, Harry Reemes, the male star of a widely known explicit movie Deep 
Throat was prosecuted for violating obscenity laws in Memphis, Tennessee. The movie had not been 
made there and it apparently had only been shown there twice before the theatre was raided by 
police. Reemes was caught travelling through town and criminally prosecuted, even though the 
movie had been shown legally in hundreds of cities by then (Overbeck 2008).  
 
The characterisation of obscenity laws as being for the protection of citizens against involuntary 
exposure to offensive material (Bray 1972), allied with taking reasonable precautions to ensure that 
the publication does not fall into the hands of persons outside of the target audience, are important 
factors in the pornography debate which was spurred by the worldwide proliferation, and 
consequent influx into Australia, of explicit pictorial erotica in the early 1970s (Fox 1980).  The 
philosophy of protecting members of the community from exposure to unsolicited offensive 
material, and minors from material that may harm or disturb them, but otherwise permitting adults 
to read and view whatever they wished was carried into the national statutory scheme for the 
classification of publications, films and computer games. This scheme involves a Commonwealth 
statute under which the Federal Office of Film and Literature Classification (OFLC) determines the 
relevant classifications and complementary State and Territory legislation provides for enforcement 
of those decisions.  For example, a film or video may be classified as either G: General — suitable for 
all ages; PG: Parental Guidance recommended for persons under 15; M: Mature — recommended 
for mature audiences 15 years and over; MA 15+: Mature Accompanied — restrictions apply to 
persons under 15 years; R 18+: Restricted — restricted to people 18 years and over; or RC: Refused 
classification. Guidelines assist in the determination of the appropriate classification.   Computer 
games have been adjudged as requiring similar classification due to advances in technology and the 
more realistic depiction of violence and sexual matters.  However, at the time of writing there is 
presently no R 18+: Restricted classification for computer games in Australia, meaning that games 
that carry a similar classification overseas are rated as RC: Refused classification in Australia.  This 
has led to additional controversy over moves by the Federal government to establish a filter on the 
internet which seeks to block matter, which may include on-line games, that would otherwise be 
rated RC: Refused classification. 
 
Under the Commonwealth Act, when making a decision on the classification of a particular 
publication, film or computer game, the OFLC must take into account the standards of morality, 
decency and propriety generally accepted by reasonable adults; the literary, artistic or educational 
merit (if any); the general character, including whether it is of medical, legal or scientific character; 
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and the persons or class of persons to or amongst whom it is to be published (Classification 
(Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (Cth), section 11).  The effect of these 
classifications is that, at least for films, publications and computer games, there have been standards 
set by virtue of the Refused Classification categories of what is considered in contemporary 
Australian society to be obscene and therefore unacceptable for publication.  The State and Territory 
legislation contains various offences based on the classification of the publication, film or computer 
game. For example, in relation to films it is generally an offence to sell or publicly exhibit 
unclassified, RC or X 18+ films (although the sale of X 18+ films is legal in the Australian Capital 
Territory and Northern Territory subject to certain conditions).   
 
Apart from the various offences, the classification of a publication, film or computer game may have 
serious commercial implications.  Depending on the classification, a product may have less of an 
audience and therefore a more limited capacity to attract income than the producer and/or 
distributor may desire. There are a number of options available in the event that a publication, film 
or computer game is given a more restrictive classification than hoped.  The original applicant or the 
publisher may apply for a review of the classification by the Classification Review Board.  
Alternatively, the offending material might be excised from the publication, film or computer game 
and a fresh application made.  As the decision by the Classification Board is an administrative 
decision, it may be the subject of judicial review, meaning that an application may be made to a 
judge to overturn the decision.  Conversely, where the relevant Government Minister or any 
aggrieved person is of the view that a publication, film or computer game has been given a less 
restrictive classification than it should have been, he or she may also apply for a review by the 
Review Board. Otherwise the Classification Board may on its own initiative or on request of the 
Government Minister reclassify the publication, film or computer game after a period of two years. 
 
3.4 Defamation 
 
Defamation occurs where one person communicates, by words, photographs, video, illustrations or 
other means, material which has the effect or tendency of damaging the reputation of another.  The 
object of the law of defamation is to strike a balance between the protection of reputation and the 
promotion of freedom of speech (Butler and Rodrick 2007).  It is important to recognise that the 
intention or motive of the publisher is irrelevant to the question of whether the published material is 
defamatory or not.  A person can therefore be defamed unintentionally or accidentally.  For 
example, in an English case Hulton v Jones [1910] AC 25 a newspaper published a fictional story 
featuring a character with the unusual name "Artemus Jones” and his sexual exploits.  Unknown to 
the publisher Artemus Jones was the name of a barrister, who was able to successfully sue the 
newspaper for substantial damages for defamation. 
 
Defamation law in Australia comprises a combination of common law and statute law. At common 
law defamation is established if defamatory material which is referable to the plaintiff is published 
to a least one other person (Butler and Rodrick 2007).  Material will be defamatory if, in the eyes of a 
right-thinking, ordinary member of the community, it is likely to injure the reputation of the plaintiff 
by exposing him or her to hatred, contempt or ridicule; tend to cause the plaintiff to be shunned or 
avoided; or has the tendency to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of others and is disparaging of 
him or her.  It is a salient warning for those in entertainment industries that merely because 
something is published in jest does not prevent cartoons, caricatures, jokes or satire from being 
subject to the laws of defamation.  For example, in a South Australian case Entienne Pty Ltd v 
Festival City Broadcasters Pty Ltd (2001) 79 SASR 19 a radio station was found liable for defamation 
for light-hearted comments made in a comedy breakfast show which suggested during a outside 
broadcast skit that a local coffee shop owner was a drug dealer. This was despite the radio station's 
intention that the skit be a comic, nonsensical spoof. 
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State and Territory defamation statutes provide a range of defences which are designed to strike a 
balance between protection of reputation and free speech.  Many of these defences may have 
limited application in the context of entertainment and instead have greater application to 
publications involving the provision of information or expression of opinions.  However, truth 
provides a complete defence.  Thus, for example, makers of docudrama television or films must take 
care that the productions do not damage the reputation of living persons who are depicted or, if 
defamatory material is shown, must be able to establish that any allegations are true both in 
substance and effect (Butler and Rodrick 2007). 
 
Further, at common law consent is a defence to defamation (Loveday v Sun Newspapers Ltd (1938) 
59 CLR 503).   Accordingly, where, for example, participants are invited to appear in a production 
where there is a possibility that they may be subject to defamatory references it is a wise precaution 
to require them to sign a carefully worded release in advance of their appearance.  However, the 
defence does not mean that if there is consent to publication of one kind, there will be a voluntary 
assumption of risk that the publication will convey an imputation which was not anticipated.  This 
was shown in a case involving the rugby league footballer Andrew Ettingshausen.  Ettingshausen 
consented to be photographed during a tour by the Australian Kangaroos for the purposes of the 
production of a book for charity.  He was photographed naked under a shower. The defendant 
subsequently published a photograph in its magazine HQ which, while grainy, was capable of being 
interpreted as depicting the plaintiff’s penis.  The court held that it was not sufficient for the 
defendant to establish that, having consented to the photographer taking the photograph, 
Ettingshausen had voluntarily assumed the risk that the photographer would fail to crop the 
photograph to be reproduced in his book so that it would not show his penis. Further, while 
Ettingshausen may have consented to the reproduction in a magazine of a photograph of him which 
had already appeared in a book being published for charity (for example, by way of publicity for the 
book), there was no evidence that the plaintiff had consented to the reproduction in a magazine of 
any photograph which had not already passed a test of good taste which would be expected for 
photographs included in such a book.  Ettingshausen was accordingly awarded substantial damages 
for defamation (Ettingshausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd  New South Wales Supreme Court, 
11 March 1993). 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
A free, liberal society allows its artists freedom to express themselves.  However, that freedom is not 
absolute.  In Australia, entertainment industries operate in a context that is governed by a mixture 
of law based both in the common law and statute law.  These laws serve to both protect the rights of 
artists and restrict their activities in the many phases of the entertainment process, including 
creation, transaction and communication.  While a detailed understanding of the intricacies of these 
laws should not be expected of those whose primary concern is the production of entertainment, a 
general understanding will assist in the greater appreciation of the borders within which society 
expects that entertainment to operate and to facilitate more efficient and effective communication 
with those who have the necessary detailed understanding, if the need arises. 
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